

Which market design for Europe? The role of capacity mechanisms

King's College London, College of Europe conference *Capacity mechanisms in Europe – The fundamental issues behind the ongoing sector inquiry*

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What are the drivers of capacity mechanisms?

Energy only or capacity mechanism?

Debunking myths about capacity mechanisms

How to ensure cross border participation in capacity mechanisms?

Conclusions





Drivers of capacity mechanisms

Drivers of capacity mechanisms The good, the bad, and the ugly...

Economic drivers

Political

drivers

Drivers of implementation of capacity mechanisms

Guarantee politically determined security of supply criteria
Address market failures affecting security of supply (missing money)
Support timely investment

Rescue stranded thermal plants
Smooth power prices to reduce "politically unsustainable" volatility
Dampen investment and retirement cycles

Drivers of reform depend on many country specific factors

- Existing generation mix and embedded flexibility
- Market arrangements
- ■Level of interconnection

Looking forward, member states have different needs

Some countries need more dependable capacity, others need flexibility to support renewables, others are well supplied by all measures...

Drivers of capacity mechanisms

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How much harmonization is necessary ?

A wide range of market arrangements across Europe...

	Model 1: Ireland	Model 2: ES, PT, IT	Model 3: Nordic, CWE	Model 4: GB
Forward Market	 No meaningful forward market 	 Financial forward market 	 Financial and physical forward markets 	 Mainly physical forward market
Day Ahead	 Central dispatch with complex bids\offers Traded volumes/prices not firm Locational bidding 	 Quasi-mandatory day- ahead auction Locational bidding 	 DA auction with strong market support Portfolio bidding 	 No particular significance of DA Portfolio bidding
Intraday	D-1 gate closureNo intraday market	 Intraday auction slots H-4 gate closure or more 	 Continuous trading H-1 gate closure (or less being considered) 	 Continuous trading H-1 gate closure
Capacity	 Fixed capacity payment 	 Capacity and availability payment 	 Strategic reserve (Nordics, Be, De) Decentralized forward capacity market (Fr) 	 Centralized forward capacity market

... which suggests harmonization of CM will be as challenging

Drivers of capacity mechanisms

Member states have different issues and needs...

	FRANCE	GERMANY	UK	SPAIN	ITALY
Local specificities	 Thermo sensitivity of power demand (electric heating) Peak demand growth 	 Grid constraints from North to South Nuclear phase-out Strong RES growth 	 Large retirements of thermal plants Limited interconnection Strong RES growth 	 Weak demand Strong RES growth Limited interconnection Quasi-mandatory pool 	 Internal zones and grid constraints Strong RES growth Central dispatch
Key issues	 Peak demand growth (+25% in 10 years) Missing money for peak plants Low profitability of CCGTs 	 Capacity needs in Southern Germany Flexibility needs Low profitability of CCGTs 	 Major investment needs (capacity gap) Retirements driven by Large Combustion Plant Directive and Industrial Emissions Directive Need for flexibility 	 Overcapacity and low profitability of CCGTs Generation back-up necessary due to RES penetration 	 Overcapacity and low profitability of CCGTs Coordination of generation and network investment Flexibility needs
Main objectives of capacity mechanisms	 Ensure generation adequacy Support the development of demand response Prevent market power abuses 	 Retain existing capacity in the Southern Germany & drive new investment Ensure availability of flexible back-up generation 	 Ensure generation adequacy Drive new investment in CCGTs Ensure availability of flexible back-up generation 	 Incentivise availability and flexibility of existing plants Manage smooth rebalancing / avoid massive retirements Limit price spikes & 	 Incentivise availability and flexibility of existing plants Manage smooth rebalancing / avoid massive retirements Prevent market
	=>	> This suggests t	hat a 'one-size-fit	volatility s-all' approach is	power abuses unlikely to work

inis suggests that a 'one-size-fits-all' approach is unlikely to work =>



Energy only or capacity mechanism?

Energy only or capacity mechanisms? Scarcity pricing is key...



Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

Utilities Policy 16 (2008) 171-183



Market design for generation adequacy: Healing causes rather than symptoms[☆]

Fabien A. Roques*

Electricity market reform and particularly the need for complementary mechanisms to remunerate capacity need to be analysed in the light of the local regulatory and institutional environment.

If there is a lack of investment, the priority should be to identify the roots of the problem.

The lack of demand-side response, short-term reliability management procedures and non-market ancillary services provision often undermine market reflective scarcity pricing and distort long-term investment incentives"



Energy only or capacity mechanisms? ...But risk hedging mechanisms are necessary

The old saying goes "Don't put the cart before the horse"



Hang on.. I must be doing something wrong.. How does that saying go again?

Can all parties (including renewables operators) exposed to market price risks hedge their risk exposure?

Scarcity pricing needs to be supplemented by hedging products / fixed cost recovery mechanisms

- There are rare cases of voluntary long term hedging mechanisms (CFDs, reliability options in Australia)
- In case of missing market / product for hedging, consider legal obligations on suppliers or centralized procurement of forward capacity / hedging products



Energy only or capacity mechanisms? Conclusion: scarcity pricing and capacity mechanisms are complimentary







Debunking myths about capacity mechanisms



4 misconceptions about capacity mechanisms

- 1 There is a choice between two opposite directions : scarcity pricing or capacity mechanisms
- Capacity mechanisms are subsidies to stranded assets
 - 3. A capacity mechanism will remove price spikes necessary to stimulate efficient system response
 - 4. Capacity mechanisms defined nationally are distorting EU energy markets

- \Rightarrow These incorrect common beliefs derive from:
 - Biased comparison of a perfect theoretical energy only market with an imperfect capacity mechanism
 - Misunderstanding of the interface between energy market and capacity mechanisms



3

Debunking myths

How do energy and capacity markets interface?

What are the concrete interactions between energy and capacity mechanism?

Short term dispatch effects

- No effect on spot market unless capacity product is linked to physical injection (none if product based on availability), and even in this case limited to crisis situations
- -Second order effects associated with changes in maintenance schedules, etc.
- -No impact on cross border flows unless specific curtailment / redispatch rules are implemented

■ Long term mix effects

- Different generation mix (changes in plant retirements / investment decisions): overcapacity only if target capacity not aligned with reliability criteria determined by policy makers
- Design parameters (technology neutrality, market based, etc.) critical to drive potential deviations from optimal mix (peak versus base load, supply versus demand, etc.)

Are the potential effects of these interactions significant?

Short term dispatch effects

- Likely insignificant, and smaller than distortions induced by uncoordinated RES policies, national generation mix interventions (support to local fuels, nuclear phase out), ETS exemptions and carbon price floor, etc.

■ Long term mix effects

- Potentially significant, but no more than RES policies / national generation mix interventions, etc.

How can the potential distortions be minimised?

- Sound design (product definition based on availability, design parameters, etc.)



How to ensure cross border participation in capacity mechanisms?

Cross-border participation in capacity mechanisms The different methods

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1 No Contribution	2 Statistical contribution	3 Interconnector participation	4 Foreign Capacity participation	5 Cross-border Capacity Mechanism
Neither interconnectors nor foreign providers contribute	Contribution evaluated statistically and deducted from capacity target	Interconnector participates directly in capacity mechanism	Foreign capacity providers participate directly in capacity mechanism	Capacity mechanisms cover several zones OR national capacity mechanisms are "coupled"
This applies to most countries with capacity payment mechanisms (price based)	Initial GB (net 0 contribution) and French approaches (~7GW out of 9GW of import capacity)	Solution implemented in GB from 2015 onwards, work in progress in Fnrance	This has been implemented in the PJM Capacity Market	No current international examples (except zones in PJM and Italy)

The definition of capacity products is a key – particularly whether the obligation is based on energy delivery or availability

Cross-border participation in capacity mechanisms Need for a framework to deal with situations of coincidental scarcity



- In this example, country A contracted capacity up to 51GW, but only 47-49GW of its demand is satisfied depending on the situation
- Without specific rules to control on capacity contracted abroad at times of scarcity, cross border participation has no value added in terms of security of supply over a simple statistical approach

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Conclusions

Conclusions

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- Current European electricity markets are incomplete and do not send the right price signals:
 - Reforms of energy markets to reward flexibility and capacity mechanisms (CMs) are both needed and complementary
 - Drivers for implementation of CMs differ across member states and explain patchwork of approaches
 - One-size-fits-all approach unlikely to work and not necessary

Interaction of CM and energy market are misunderstood and largely overplayed:

- Well designed CM will not reduce price spikes, or affect cross border flows significantly
- Magnitude of potential distortions is small compared to distortions associated with other public interventions (RES support, etc.)

Cross border participation in CMs raises complex issues:

- Several approaches possible for explicit foreign participation with pros and cons
- Need for a European framework to deal with situations of coincidental scarcity

Capacity mechanisms are only a stepping stone - long term market design challenges:

- TM historically focussed on short term operational issues, focus needs to turn to investment incentives
- Risk hedging/sharing mechanisms such as long term contracts to reduce financing costs and support investment
- Coordination mechanisms for transmission, merchant generation and policy driven clean technologies

References

Toward the Target Model 2.0 – Policy Recommendations for a sustainable market design

Web link



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Publications on capacity mechanisms

- Market design for generation adequacy: healing causes rather than symptoms <u>Web</u> <u>link</u>
- Coordinating capacity mechanisms which way forward? Web link
- European electricity market reforms: the "visible hand" of public coordination <u>Web link</u>

Publications on European electricity markets

The new European Energy Union - Toward a consistent EU energy and climate policy? <u>Web</u> <u>link</u>

European electricity markets in crisis: diagnostic and way forward Web link

Thank you for your attention

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22

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